Machine learning has increasingly become the most used approach for inference and decision making in wearable sensor systems. However, recent studies have found that machine learning systems are easily fooled by the addition of adversarial perturbation to their inputs. What is more interesting is that the adversarial examples generated for one machine learning system can also degrade the performance of another. This property of adversarial examples is called transferability. In this work, we take the first strides in studying adversarial transferability in wearable sensor systems, from the following perspectives: 1) Transferability between machine learning models, 2) Transferability across subjects, 3) Transferability across sensor locations, and 4) Transferability across datasets. With Human Activity Recognition (HAR) as an example sensor system, we found strong untargeted transferability in all cases of transferability. Specifically, gradient-based attacks were able to achieve higher misclassification rates compared to non-gradient attacks. The misclassification rate of untargeted adversarial examples ranged from 20% to 98%. For targeted transferability between machine learning models, the success rate of adversarial examples was 100% for iterative attack methods. However, the success rate for other types of targeted transferability ranged from 20% to 0%. Our findings strongly suggest that adversarial transferability has serious consequences not only in sensor systems but also across the broad spectrum of ubiquitous computing.
INTRODUCTION
Human Activity Recognition (HAR) has a substantial footprint in the field of mobile and ubiquitous computing. Traditionally the systems used for activity recognition utilized videos and images as inputs [20] to the detection algorithms, but recently there has been a significant shift towards the use of inertial sensors such as accelerometer, gyroscope, and magnetometer [11] . Moreover, advances in sensor technology and detection algorithms allow for real-time and continuous detection of human activities with battery-powered devices of small form factor to be used in daily living situations [22] . This has propelled the use of wearable devices for human activity recognition in areas such as health monitoring, patients rehabilitation, athlete performance assessment, and medical adherence.
In the current context, machine learning algorithms have become an integral part of most HAR systems. In particular, the state-of-the-art systems and commercial devices used for human activity recognition use machine learning algorithms to detect various biomarkers and joint movements to provide real-time continuous clinical assessments based on the sensor data. However, the exceptional performance of these machine learning algorithms is not without any shortcomings. Recent studies have found that an adversary can easily fool machine learning algorithms with the addition of carefully computed perturbation to their inputs [5, 10, 19] . These perturbed inputs are referred to as adversarial examples. Even the addition of a small amount of carefully computed perturbations to the original inputs can degrade the performance of machine learning systems significantly [16, 19, 21] . What distinguishes adversarial perturbations from random noise is that adversarial examples are misclassified far more often than samples that have been perturbed by random noise, even if the magnitude of random noise is much larger compared to the adversarial perturbation [21] . The problem of adversarial examples has significant consequences not only because it can fool a machine learning system but also because of how easily an adversary can compute these examples.
Motivation
One intriguing property of adversarial examples is called transferability. Transferability captures the ability of an adversarial attack against a machine learning model to be effective against a different potentially unknown model [8] . The transferability of adversarial examples was first examined in [21] , in which the authors studied the transferability 1) between different machine learning models trained over the same dataset, and 2) between same or different machine learning models trained over disjoint subsets of a dataset. Following this, there have been numerous works on adversarial transferability for both the test-time evasion attacks and training-time poisoning attacks [8, 16, 19] . However, most of the research work on adversarial transferability stems from the domain of computer vision and natural language processing, and there remains a gap in research to understand the transferability of adversarial examples in the context of ubiquitous computing that involves wearable sensor systems used for human activity recognition.
Prior research has shown that adversarial examples can be generated in wearable sensor systems for human activity recognition [19] . However, the transferability of adversarial examples that takes into account the characteristics of wearable sensor systems has not been studied yet, thus leaving a gap in the research which we believe has essential and novel consequences. This is because, in addition to the traditional notion of transferability -between different models trained on the same or disjoint subsets of data -we also need to consider new dimensions when exploring adversarial transferability in sensor systems. For starter wearable sensor systems are highly dynamic and have many different variabilities associated with it, which can impact the way these systems operate. For example, consider the placement of a wearable device on the human body. For human activity recognition, there are many devices available in the market today that can be worn on the body in various ways. Some are worn as a watch; others can be clipped on to clothes or shoes, strapped around the chest, and so forth.
Furthermore, depending on the body location of the device, the sensor readings are very different, and consequently, machine learning algorithms trained on these sensor data behave uniquely. Therefore an adversary who is planning to attack these types of machine learning systems must take into account the different variations associated with a sensor system. These variations are well discussed in the literature [14, 24] for the case of building inference models that have higher classification performance but have not been addressed yet concerning adversarial transferability. All these lead to the fact that adversarial transferability in sensor systems is not simple and straightforward and has many nuances. We believe an extensive study of the adversarial transferability will not only show the strength of adversarial attacks but also mark its shortcomings and help us understand and advance our knowledge about this unexplored problem space.
Contribution
In this paper, we present the first comprehensive evaluation of the transferability of adversarial examples in the context of wearable sensor systems. We not only consider the traditional notion of transferability but extend that with novel transferability directions, which we believe are unique to wearable sensor systems. In particular, we discuss the transferability of adversarial examples from the following four perspectives:
• Transferability between different machine learning models • Transferability across subjects • Transferability across sensor locations • Transferability across datasets.
And in doing so, in this work we make the following contributions:
(1) We introduce and define different types of adversarial transferability in the context of wearable sensor systems. (2) We conduct extensive sets of experiments that highlights the vulnerabilities machine learning systems under different transferability settings.
(3) We presents results under different threat models for both untargeted and targeted attacks. We also show how adversarial transferability differs in wearable sensor systems from well-established norms. (4) We discuss open problems and possible research directions for adversarial transferability in general for time-series machine learning systems.
In the next section, we briefly discuss the human activity recognition pipeline and adversarial machine learning. We review the different properties of adversarial machine learning and introduce several methods of generating adversarial examples that we have used in this project. In section 3, we discuss our approach and explain the significance and consequence of this work. We explain why adversarial transferability in sensor systems have more facets than which is already known and discuss them in detail. We introduce and define metrics that we have used to measure the transferability under targeted and untargeted thread models. In the next section, we describe our experiments and results, which also include details about the hyperparameters used for training different machine learning models. Finally, we present our conclusion and discuss open problems for future research.
BACKGROUND
Our discussion of the transferability of adversarial examples in the context of sensor systems uses human activity recognition as an example for experimentation purposes. Therefore, before we discuss adversarial machine learning and transferability in detail, we will first briefly explain the human activity recognition pipeline.
Human Activity Recognition Pipeline
The problem of human activity recognition can be defined in the following way. Given a set W = {W 0 , ...,W m−1 } of m equally sized temporal window of sensor readings, such that each window W i contains a set of sensor reading S = {S i,0 , ..., S i,k −1 }, and a set A = {a 0 , ...a n − 1} of n activity labels, the goal is to find a mapping function f : S i → A that can be evaluated for all possible values of S i [11] . The activity recognition system generally consists of sensing, signal processing, signal segmentation, feature extraction and selection, and classification stages. Raw data from various sensors, such as accelerometer, gyroscope, and magnetometer, are collected and passed into the signal processing stage, where filtering and noise removal are applied to the sensor signals. The next stage is segmentation, where a continuous stream of the sensor values is divided into temporal windows. There are three types of segmentation methods: (1) activity-defined window; (2) event-defined window; and (3) sliding window. The sliding window method is used most widely due to its simplicity and real-time performance. After segmentation, statistical and structural features are extracted from each window segment and are used to train machine learning algorithms for activity classification. Another very successful approach to human activity classification is to use a convolutional neural network (CNN). What separates the CNN approach from other machine learning approaches is that CNN altogether removes the need to compute features from raw sensor signals for classification. The input to the CNN model is usually the raw sensor signal with or without segmentation, and the CNN model learns the features and the classifier simultaneously during the training process.
Adversarial Machine Learning
The problem of adversarial examples in machine learning systems can be summarized as follows. Given a machine learning classifier f θ (x) characterized by the parameters θ and dataset D such that D = {(x, y)}, an adversary aims to find inputs that are formed by applying small but intentional perturbations to the original samples x from the dataset such that the perturbed inputsx are almost indistinguishable from the original samples and result in the classifier predicting an incorrect labelȳ with high confidence. These perturbed input samples are called adversarial examples. Hence, the objective of adversarial learning is to find perturbation δ which when added to the original inputs x i.e.,x = x + δ changes the output of the classifier f θ (x) y. In general, there are three ways in which an adversary can attack a machine learning system.
(1) Poisoning Attack: In poisoning attack or confidence reduction, an adversary attempts to degrade the performance of a machine learning classifier by injecting adversarial examples during the training process, which results in the classifier learning false connections. Here, the goal of the adversary is more focused on influencing the performance of the trained system as a whole rather than have it make mistakes on some input samples. (2) Evasion Attack: Evasion attack is the most common type of attack which is carried out during the test time.
In general, an evasion attack involves getting a trained model to make mistakes on input samples. Evasion attack is sub-divided into two types: 1) non-targeted attack, and 2) targeted attack. For a non-targeted adversarial examplex, an adversary intends to missclassifyx into any class other than its true class i.e., f θ (x) y such that f θ (x) = y. For a targeted adversarial examplex, the adversary defines the target classȳ in which it aims to have the classifier classify the adversarial example i.e., f θ (x) =ȳ. (3) Exploratory Attack: In exploratory attacks, the adversary tries to gain as much knowledge as possible about the learning algorithm of the target system and pattern in the training data. Exploratory attacks are carried out when the adversary does not have access to the target system, and it only intends to understand how the target system works. In this work, we will only discuss different types of evasion attack methods because we will be showing the nature of adversarial transferability in different settings during the testing phase of a machine learning system.
Adversarial
Knowledge. The extent of an adversary's knowledge about the target system defines the setting in which it operates. In general, there are two types of attack settings, depending on the adversary's knowledge about the target system.
(1) White-box Setting: A white-box setting assumes that the adversary has complete knowledge about the target system. It includes anything related to the target system such as dataset, model architectures, hyper-parameters values, activation functions, number of layers, and model weight. This comprehensive knowledge about the target system makes it easier for the adversary to mount an attack. (2) Black-box Setting: In the black-box setting, the adversary has zero knowledge about the target system details except for access to an oracle to submit inputs and observe outputs. This makes it harder for an adversary to attack the target system. The adversary first has to query the target model with inputs and observe the outputs to build a dataset and then train a substitute model to compute adversarial examples. The adversary also needs to make sure that it does not query the target model excessively as this excessive querying may serve as a sign for an attack. Hence, the adversary needs to use some selection criteria for selecting inputs that yield the most information about the target system. The difficulty of operating in a black-box setting is usually avoided by using the transferability property of adversarial examples. It has been shown that adversarial examples computed for one system are also effective against other systems [16] . For example, adversarial examples computed for a DNN model are easily transferred to a support vector machine (SVM) with a high rate of adversarial performance. Adversarial transferability is not only valid for models operating in the same domain, but also across domains [13] . In our experiments, we have assumed both white-box and black-box access to machine learning models depending upon the criteria of adversarial transferability. We consider white-box access to models that are used to compute adversarial examples and black-box access to other models.
2.2.2
Perturbation and Imperceptibility . The definition of adversarial examples dictates that the perturbation added to the original samples be very small such that the resulting adversarial examples are close to the original samples and imperceptible to human eyes. We argue that the condition of imperceptibility originates from the fact that most of the discussion on adversarial examples originate from the computer vision field. But in the case of wearable sensor systems such as human activity recognition, the notion of imperceptibility does not make sense. Usually, in sensor systems, there is no well-defined representation of sensor reading associated with outcome classes. For example, in human activity recognition systems, we do not have any predefined temporal and structural definitions of sensor readings associated with different activity classes compared to image classification, where we exactly know how an image of a cat should look like. Therefore, we need a newer definition that allows us to bake the idea of imperceptibility in our case. Equation 1 shows one of measuring perturbation using the Euclidean norm.
Here, x andx are the original and adversarial sensor segments, and N is the length of the segment.
Methods of Generating Adversarial Examples
Now that we have some understanding about different types of adversarial attacks and how the knowledge of an adversary defines the context in which it operates. We discuss several types of evasion adversarial attack methods designed for the white-box setting. The fundamental condition when computing adversarial example is that the perturbation added to the original samples to get adversarial samples cannot be large, because adding large perturbations destroys the information in the original samples. Hence, we need a bound on the value of perturbations that are computed by the different attack methods. For a model f , we can formalize the adversarial samplesx as a solution to the following optimization problem:
Here, ∥.∥ can be any type of norm (l p ) depending on the method used to compute adversarial examples. In general, l 0 , l 2 and l ∞ norms are used. For two vectors x andx, l 0 counts the number of elements inx that has changed its values compared to x, l 2 measure the Euclidean distance between the two vectors, and l ∞ denotes the maximum changes for all elements in the vectorx.
The attack methods we discuss in the next section, solve the above optimization problem 2 in one way or another. Please note that here we only discuss attack methods that satisfy our various requirements. There are many other adversarial attack methods in both white-box and black-box settings that we have left out for some reason.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM).
The first attack we discuss is the Fast gradient sign method (FGSM). FGSM was proposed by Goodfellow et al., [10] and is one of the simplest and computationally efficient methods to solve the equation 2. FGSM computes the adversarial perturbation by calculating the gradient of the cost function with respect to the input of the neural network. This method solves the following optimization problem to maximize the cost such that the perturbations are bounded by ϵ subject to l ∞ norm.
Here, J θ is the cost function, and ∇ x denotes the gradient of the model with respect to the original input x, and y is the actual label [7] . The fast gradient sign method can be extended to compute targeted adversarial examples.
For targeted examples, FGSM minimizes the loss function with respect to input x such that it is classified into the target classȳ specified by an adversary.x
Notice the change in sign and also the presence of the target classȳ in the optimization equation 4. Here, we are trying to find adversarial perturbations δ which, when added to the original samples from any class, results in the model classifying them into the target classȳ. For the untargeted case, FGSM finds adversarial perturbation that results in misclassification of the inputs, i.e., the adversary does not care about the output class.
Basic
Iterative Method (BIM). Basic iterative method (BIM) is the straightforward extension to the fast gradient sign method is to run it n number of times with a small step size until some requirements are satisfied. Iteratively running FGSM allows the adversary to search the model input space more thoroughly to find optimal perturbations.x
Here, α is the step size and is equal to the ratio between ϵ and the number of iterations n. Clip x,ϵ (A) denotes the element-wise clipping of A, such that the range of
The basic iterative method can also be used to compute targeted adversarial examples by the simple modification of sign reversal and the introduction of the target class in the optimization equation 5.
Jacobian-Based Saliency Map Attack (SMM)
. Jacobian-based saliency map attack [17] first computes the Jacobian matrix of the given input x,
Here, F is the second-to-last layer logits of the neural network. With this, the adversary finds the input features of x that cause the most significant changes to the output of the model. Now a small perturbation is designed to successfully induce significant output variations so that a change in a small portion of features could fool the neural network [23] .
Carlini-Wagner
Attack (CW). The Carlini-Wagner attack was proposed to defeat defensive distillation [6] , but later the authors showed that this attack is effective against most adversarial defense methods. This attack finds the adversarial instance by finding the smallest noise δ ∈ R nxn which, when added to an input x, changes the classification to a class t. Formally it solves the following optimization problem:
where C(x) is the class label returned with input x and the noise level is measured using either l 0 , l 2 or l ∞ norm.
Momentum Iterative Attack (MIM).
Momentum iterative attack method [9] integrates the concept of momentum into the basic iterative method to generate adversarial examples for targeted and non-targeted cases using l 2 and l ∞ norms respectively. The momentum is a technique for accelerating gradient descent algorithms by accumulating a velocity vector in the gradient direction of the loss function across iterations [9] . The introduction of momentum helps the method achieve optimum results faster by stabilizing update directions and escaping from poor local maxima.
APPROACH
In this section, we discuss the approach we have used to evaluate adversarial transferability for wearable sensor systems. We highlight and explain different types of adversarial transferability and define metrics that we have used to measure untargeted and targeted adversarial transferability. After that, we discuss the datasets used in our experiments and outline some conditions that are crucial for the sound analysis of transferability in different cases.
Adversarial Transferability
Human activity classification usually employs some wearable device such as a smartwatch, smartphone, smart shoes, chest band, fitness band to detect and measure physical activities. The underlying machine learning algorithms use the data from sensors to learn the characteristics of different activities and make an inference. And depending on the properties of these sensors, the sensor reading can vary significantly even though the sensors are trying to detect and measure the same physical phenomena. This is because human activities are highly complex, dynamic, and diverse, and the sensor readings for an activity vary significantly even if the same person performs the same activity under similar conditions compared to say image classification where an image of a dog is always a dog independent of the presentation and context. These variations in the sensor reading eventually reach machine learning models and create newer challenges for an adversary that wants to attack these systems. From differences in the electrical properties of the sensor to the locations on the human body where these sensors are placed, there are numerous ways in which different aspects of the sensor systems can affect adversarial transferability. Therefore adversarial transferability in the context of wearable sensor systems has many newer dimensions than the traditional notion of transferability and requires a detailed study to evaluate and understand its cause and consequences. To this end in this work, we study adversarial transferability from the following four perspectives:
• Transferability between machine learning models The transferability between different machine learning models trained on a dataset to solve the same problem is the default and the most discussed notion of adversarial transferability. In this scenario, given two or more machine learning models, the adversary computes adversarial examples using one model and then performs adversarial attacks on other models using the computed adversarial examples. We already know that this type of adversarial transferability has shown great success from previous works [13, 16, 19] , and we want to verify this in our case.
• Transferability across subjects
In sensor systems, the dataset used to train a machine learning model is often collected using human subjects. This is similar to an image dataset where the images of various objects are captured using different types of cameras. But what separates human subjects from the optical sensor in cameras is that human subjects inject biases in the data that are personalized to each user. And these biases in sensor data are hard to eliminate compared to the image files, which can be preprocessed to meet a set of specifications. Having artifacts associated with users makes the problem of adversarial transferability in sensor systems more complicated and, the adversary needs to give proper attention to these details when designing an attack. For example, a system designed to detect strokes and anxiety also contains features based on the subject's physiology and health that are baked in the sensor reading and, these features vary between-subject. Hence, evaluating adversarial transferability between machine learning models trained on data from different subjects becomes very important.
• Transferability across sensor locations
Another essential attribute associated with wearable sensor systems is the location on the human body where the device is placed. For example, wearable activity trackers can be worn in many different ways. Some can be worn as a wristwatch or band, others can be clipped on to clothes and shoes or placed inside pockets, and some can be even worn as jewelry. For two sensors of the same type -one wrapped around the subject's chest and other worn on the wrist -the values of accelerations depends heavily on the orientation of the sensor and other factors. And this differences in the sensor readings further complicates the matter for an adversary that wants to attack these types of wearable sensor systems.
• Transferability across datasets
The final and most complex notion of transferability is transferability between machine learning modelssame or of different architectures -trained for the same task but using different datasets. For example, for the same task of human activity recognition, different manufacturers use different types of sensors and collect proprietary datasets to train their models. Now for an adversary that has access to say, model M 1 , and its dataset D 1 , it is challenging to make the adversarial examples computed using M 1 transferable to some other model M 2 trained using dataset D 2 . The challenges can stem from bias from subjects, sensors placed at different sensor positions, different types of sensors, different data processing techniques. Hence, in the final part of our experiments, we tackle adversarial transferability from this direction.
Measuring Transferability
In the simplest sense, when we measure adversarial transferability, we are saying how many of the adversarial samples designed for model M 
Datasets
In our experiments, we have used two datasets to test different properties of adversarial transferability in the context of sensor systems. Since we are taking human activity recognition as an example system, we have conducted our experiments with 3-axial accelerometer data.
(1) UCI dataset [2] was compiled from a group of 30 participants, each wearing a smartphone on their waist and performing 6 different activities: standing, sitting, laying down, walking, walking upstairs and walking downstairs in the lab setting. 3-axial accelerometer and gyroscope sensors were sampled at a frequency of 50 Hz, pre-processed by applying noise filters, and then segmented into fixed-length sliding windows of 2.56 seconds (128 readings per window) with 50% overlap. Form each window, 561 features were computed from the time and frequency domain. Furthermore, the acceleration signal is separated into body acceleration and gravity components using a Butterworth low-pass filter. The gravitational force is assumed to have only low-frequency components; therefore, a filter with 0.3 Hz cutoff frequency was used. In our experiments, we use both the feature data and body acceleration values to train and evaluate different machine learning models. Figure 1 shows the number of samples for each activity class in the dataset. (2) MHEALTH dataset [4] consists of body motion and vital signs recording of 10 volunteers of different profiles while performing 12 different physical activities: standing, sitting, laying down, walking, climbing stairs, waist bend forward, frontal elevation arms, knees bending, cycling, jogging, running and jump front and back. Shimmer2 wearable device placed on the subject's chest, right wrist, and left ankle were used to measure the motion experienced by the diverse body parts using a 3-axial accelerometer at a frequency of 50 Hz. Each session was recorded using a video camera for labeling the sensor reading accurately. The activities were performed in an out-of-lab environment with no constraint on the way they must be executed, with the exception that the subject tries their best when executing them. No preprocessing of the data was done to avoid the removal of any relevant information. The sensor readings are segmented into windows of size 2.56 seconds, i.e., 128 readings per window with an overlap of 50% between consecutive segments. Figure 2 shows the number of data samples for each class in the MHEALTH dataset. The class Jump Front & Back has fewer number of samples compared to other classes. Therefore, to balance the dataset, we have removed the samples from the Jump Front & Back class. Now that we understand the different characteristics of both datasets, we need to establish some conditions so that the analysis of adversarial transferability between them is possible and accurate.
(1) Input Size: First and foremost, the length of the window segment in both datasets must be the same because we cannot build machine learning models that can take inputs of different sizes. In our experiments, we have set the length of the input vector to 128 in all cases. Setting the window size to 128 was motivated by the fact that a window size of 1-2 seconds with 50% overlap is considered a good choice for activity classification [3] . (2) Sampling Frequency: One of the criteria that we have used to select datasets for our experiments is the sampling frequency of the sensor. For both UCI and MHEALTH datasets, the sampling frequency is 50 Hz, which is considered adequate for human activity [12] . ]. Hence, it becomes vital that we scale the datasets such that both datasets have values in the same range. For this we use the MinMaxScaler with range set to [-1.0, 1.0] from the sklearn library [18] to scale the dataset. MinMaxScaler is the least disruptive to the information in the original data and preserves the shape of the data and does not reduce the importance of outliers. (4) Activity Classes: Another important factor when choosing the dataset for the experiments was the activity classes. The baseline condition was that there should be some activity classes that are common to both datasets because this would allow us to analyze targeted adversarial transferability between datasets. The activities walking, sitting, standing, laying down and climbing stairs (walking up) are common to both datasets. Also, having activities classes that are not common between the datasets further helps us analyze transferability with generalization.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we discuss our experiments and results. Here, we have for cases of adversarial transferability, and for each case, we have analysis for targeted and untargeted attacks.
Transferability Between Machine Learning Models
To analyze the transferability across machine learning models, we first train different machine learning models and compute adversarial examples using one of the trained models. For this, we have chosen to use the feature data from the UCI dataset. Using the feature data enables us to train different kinds of machine learning algorithms, which may not work or maybe too computationally complex to train using the raw sensor data. We have selected the following algorithms for training: 1) Support Vector Classifier (SVC), 2) Random Forest Classifier (RFC), 3) K-Nearest Neighbor Classifier (KNN), 4) Decision Tree Classifier (DTC), 5) Deep Neural Network (DNN) and 6) Logistic Regression Classifier (LRC). Figure 3 shows the performance of the trained models on the test and training sets. All the different machine learning models have very high classification accuracy on both training and testing sets. Only the decision tree classifier (DTC) has classification accuracy (86.29%) less than 90% on the test set. The deep neural network (DNN) has 3 layers with 64, 32, and 6 neurons respectively. L2-regularization with coefficient 0.001 and ReLU activation is used on the first and second layers, and the output layer has Softmax activation. TensorFlow [1] was used to train the deep neural network with hyper-parameters: 50 epoch, mini-batch size of 32, Adam optimizer, and sparse categorical cross-entropy loss. All other classifiers were trained using the sklearn library. The maximum iteration for SVC was set to 5000 with scaled gamma, and the number of estimators for RFC was set to 100. For logistic regression, the LBFGS solver was used with 5000 maximum iterations. All other parameters of classifiers were set to their default values.
Next, to evaluate these machine learning models for adversarial transferability, we compute targeted and non-targeted adversarial examples using the DNN model. We have used five different attack methods: 1) Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), 2) Basic Iterative Method (BIM), 3) Momentum Iterative Method (MIM), 4) Saliency Map Method (SMM) and 5) Carlini-Wagner Method (CW) to compute the adversarial examples. These attack methods differ in their optimization approaches and complexity. The CleverHans [15] library was used to compute the adversarial examples with the following parameters:
(1) Since the range of feature data is [-1.0, 1.0], the maximum perturbation magnitude is 0.5 i.e., ϵ = 0.5.
(2) For clipping the range is set to [−1.0, 1.0].
(3) The number of iterations where needed, like for basic iterative method and momentum iterative method, is set to 50. Figure 4 shows the misclassification rate of the classifiers on the adversarial examples. All attacks except the saliency map and the Carlini-Wagner methods have high misclassification rates for all classifiers. The adversarial examples computed using the saliency map and Carlini-Wagner methods are performing well on the DNN model, but have poor misclassification rates on other classifiers. Therefore, the adversarial perturbation generated by the Saliency Map and Carlini-Wagner methods has weak transferability properties, even though these are very successful against the target model (DNN). Another interesting finding is that the attacks that have good transferability are all based on gradient-based optimization of the loss function. Hence, for the case of untargeted adversarial transferability between machine learning models, gradient-based attacks are more effective than other types of attack methods.
Targeted Transferability.
To compute targeted adversarial examples, we first need to select one target class. In the UCI dataset, there are six activity classes: standing, sitting, walking, laying down, walking upstairs, and walking downstairs. We have selected the sitting class as the target class. Figure 5 shows 
Transferability Across Subjects
In sensor systems, the dataset used to train machine learning models is usually collected using human subjects. The use of human subjects introduces additional information and biases in the sensor readings that are associated with each user of the device. For example, every individual has differences in gait and body movements that are unique to them. Hence, to better understand the effects of adversarial transferability in sensor systems, we need to take this aspect of wearable systems into account. In this section, we study how and by what amount the variation in sensor reading associated with the inherent characteristics of the user affects adversarial transferability. For this, we train two machine learning models with the same architecture and learning properties on different datasets. The adversary has white-box access to one model, using which it computes adversarial examples and evaluates the performance of these adversarial examples on the other model. In our case, both the UCI and MHEALTH datasets have a user ID associated with each row of data. The UCI and MHEALTH dataset was collected from 30 and 10 participants, respectively. Hence, we divide these datasets into two groups such that one group has the data from participants with even user ID and the other group from participants with odd user ID. The adversary can have access to one of these groups, using which it trains a machine learning model and computes adversarial examples. Also, when computing adversarial examples, the adversary can set different values to the epsilon (ϵ), a parameter that controls the magnitude of the adversarial perturbation. Since, our dataset is in the range [−1.0, 1.0], we have decided to use the following values of ϵ in our experiments ϵ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}. Also, we have used the 1D convolutional neural network (CNN) as the machine learning classifier because of its simplicity and better performance. The architecture of the CNN model is as follows:
• The first layer, the input layer, is a 1D CNN layer with 100 filters, kernels of size 10, strides of 2, and ReLU activation. • The second layer is a 1D CNN layer with 50 filters, kernel size of 5, strides of 1, and ReLU activation.
• The third layer is a 1D Global Max Pooling layer.
• The fourth layer is a fully-connected layer with 64 neurons and ReLU activation. We have set the drop out coefficient for this layer to 0.3. • The last layer, an output layer, is a fully connected layer with 12 neurons for MHEALTH data and 6 neurons for UCI data. The activation function for this layer is the Softmax function.
The CNN model is trained using the Adam optimizer with learning rate set to 0.001 and no learning rate decay.
The loss of the model is computed using the categorical cross-entropy loss function. 
Untargeted Transferability.
To evaluate untargeted transferability, the adversary computes adversarial examples using the even model and calculates the misclassification rate. Figure 6 shows the misclassification rate of the even and odd models on the adversarial examples computed using different attack methods at multiple values of epsilon ϵ. The solid and dashed lines show the misclassification rate of the even model and the odd model. And the different attack methods are represented using different colors. For example, the misclassification rate of adversarial examples computed using the basic iterative method (BIM) is shown by the blue color. With the increase in the value of epsilon, the misclassification rate of CNN models on adversarial examples also increases for all attack methods except the Carlini-Wagner method. The Carlini-Wagner method is able to achieve the highest rate of misclassification at the lowest value of epsilon, and the increase in the value of epsilon did not affect its performance. The adversarial examples computed using the Carlini-Wagner method are more tailored toward the model used to compute adversarial examples and lack the transferability properties necessary to make the examples transferable. Other attack methods show better transferability with misclassification rates of the odd model lowest at 40% and highest at 95%.
Targeted Transferability.
With the target class set to Walking, the success rate of the adversarial examples computed using different attack methods is shown in figure 7 . The graph shows the success rate of both odd and even CNN models on the adversarial examples. For the even model, the success rate of adversarial examples gets better with the increases in the value of epsilon and reaches the maximum values at ϵ = 0.5. But this is only true for gradient-based iterative attack methods. For FGSM, the success rate decrease with an increase in the value of ϵ. This is because the fast gradient sign method is only adding perturbation scaled by the value of epsilon, and at higher values of epsilon, the perturbation added to original samples destroys the temporal and spatial information in the original samples. For the Saliency Map method, the success rate peaks at ϵ = 0.5 and only decrease slightly at ϵ = 0.9. We believe this is because the Saliency Map method fails to find optimal perturbation due to the limitations involved in the optimization algorithm. The success rate of the odd model shows that the transferability of targeted examples. The maximum success rate of the odd model is around 22%, and only the Basic Iterative method, Saliency Map method, and Carlin-Wagner method can achieve this. The success rate of the Momentum Iterative method and Fast Gradient Sign method plummets to zero at ϵ = 0. This is a sharp contrast to the untargeted attack, for which the classification accuracy of odd and even model did not have substantial differences. Hence, the targeted adversarial attack gives us a better measure of adversarial transferability than the untargeted attack. This is because the untargeted attack is successful as long as the adversary can classify an input into any class other than its true class. But for the targeted attack to be successful, the attacker needs to make sure that it classifies an input into the target class, which is much more difficult compared to random misclassification.
Transferability Across Sensor Locations
In wearable systems, sensors can be placed at different body positions to measure the same physiological variation and bio-markers. For example, to detect human activity, a person can use wearable devices that can be placed at different body positions. The device can be worn on the wrist like a watch, placed in a pocket, worn around the ankle, attached to shoes and clothes, wrapped around the chest, and in many more ways. This numerous ways in which the sensor can be placed on the human body introduce artifacts and biases in the sensor reading than can cause problems for an adversary. Therefore, it becomes crucial to study adversarial transferability considering this variability in wearable sensor systems.
The MHEALTH dataset has readings from three same-type of accelerometer sensors placed at different body positions. The first sensor is wrapped around the subject chest, the second is worn by the subject on the right wrist, and the last one is worn on the left ankle. All the sensors have the same physical and electrical characteristics, and the subjects perform the physical activities in the natural setting without any intervention and control measures. To evaluate adversarial transferability in this case, we train a CNN model using data from a sensor placed at one body location, say chest, and use this trained model to compute adversarial examples using different attack methods. We will then evaluate these adversarial examples on a different model trained using data from a sensor placed at another body location, for example, right wrist. This will enable us to assess adversarial transferability across sensors located at different body positions.
Chest
Vs. Right Wrist. We use the sensor readings from the chest sensor and right wrist sensor to analyze the adversarial transferability across body locations. But before we show the results of adversarial transferability, we need to first measure the performance of trained CNN models on data from another sensor. The classification accuracy of the chest model on the data from the wrist sensor was 12.46%, and the wrist model on the data from the chest sensor was 15.44%. This shows that even though both of these sensors are measuring the same physical activities, the inherent characteristics in sensor reading have significant differences. Also, please note that the data from both sensors are processed using the same systems, and the difference between them is because of the temporal and spatial variations due to the sensor body positions. Figure 8 shows the misclassification rate of the chest and wrist models on adversarial examples computed using the chest model. The adversarial examples are performing well on both the chest and wrist models and can reach 100% misclassification rate at higher values of epsilon. Also, notice the 90% misclassification rate for the wrist model at higher values of epsilon. All attack methods except, the SMM are working well, which has a higher misclassification rate for the wrist model than the chest model. This is again a sharp contrast to other types of transferability we have discussed so far, and further establishes our reasons for evaluating adversarial transferability across body positions. Tables  1 and 2 show the success rate of the adversarial examples on chest and wrist models respectively. For the chest model, with the increase in the value of epsilon, the success rate of adversarial examples also increases and reaches 100% for the Carlini-Wagner attack at ϵ = 0.5. Only the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and Saliency map method (SMM) have less than 100% success rate at higher values of epsilon. For FGSM, this is due to the addition of larger valued perturbation to the original samples that destroys the information in the original samples. We have seen similar results for the case of transferability across subjects. The non-optimal performance of the SMM is because of the inefficiencies of the optimization method used to compute adversarial examples. In table 2, we have the success rate of adversarial examples on the wrist model. The success rate of adversarial examples is 0% for all attack methods at all values of epsilon. Hence, there is no targeted adversarial transferability across different sensor body positions. This shows that even though sensor systems share many features and vulnerabilities with traditional machine learning systems, they also have unique characteristics that require personalized measures to achieve similar results.
Untargeted Transferability.

Transferability Across Datasets
The final frontier of adversarial transferability in the context of sensor systems is transferability across datasets. Transferability between datasets not only includes all other types of transferability we have discussed so far but augments that with many new variabilities such as sensor types, wearable device type, electrical properties of the sensor, and many others. In our experiments, we have two different datasets: UCI and MHEALTH. We train two CNN models having the same architecture and training parameters using the datasets. The adversary has white-box access to the UCI model and computes adversarial examples using it. We then evaluate these adversarial examples on both the UCI and MEHALTH models. Figure 9 shows the misclassification rate of the UCI and MHEALTH models on the adversarial examples. Once again, we see that the misclassification rates of both models are very similar and, in some cases, the MHEALTH model having higher values such as at ϵ = 0.5 and ϵ = 0.9 for the FGSM attack.
But higher values of misclassification rate does not tell us much about the strength of these attack methods in terms of transferability. It is because even without any adversarial modification to the inputs samples, the misclassification rate of the MHEALTH model on the UCI data was 80.99%. And from the figure, we can see that for all attack methods except the FGSM, the misclassification rate is below 90% at all values of epsilon. Therefore, misclassification rates for untargeted adversarial examples do not give us any information about the transferability of the adversarial examples because the inherent variability between the datasets in most cases can fulfill the adversary's requirements. 
CONCLUSIONS AND OUTCOMES
Adversarial examples are shown to be transferable across machine learning models that are trained on the whole or subset of the same dataset. However, the problem of adversarial transferability does not end there. For the first time in literature, we have investigated novel types of adversarial transferability in the context of wearable sensor systems with an extensive set of experiments. These new aspects of adversarial transferability show how an adversary can utilize the properties of sensor systems to craft adversarial examples in ways not discussed before. Our results not only demonstrate that there exist many new types of adversarial transferability but also show where these techniques excel and fail.
In our experiments, we have first discussed the transferability across machine learning models. Using the feature data from the UCI dataset, we found very strong untargeted transferability between different types of machine learning models with five attack methods. Only the saliency map method and Carlini-Wagner method showed poor untargeted transferability. Given that these attacks use complicated optimization to find adversarial perturbations, the underlying reasons for their poor transferability performance remains unclear. Similar results were obtained for the targeted transferability, with target class Sitting. All the gradient-based attacks demonstrated good targeted transferability with the basic iterative method outperforming all other methods. Also, the adversarial examples were found to be most effective against the logistic regression model with the success rate of 100% and least effective against the decision tree model with the maximum success rate of 30%. This shows that for transferability across models, gradient-based attacks are much more competent at finding adversarial perturbations with excellent transferability properties. Furthermore, non-parametric models such as decision tree classifiers and a k-nearest neighbor classifier were more robust to adversarial examples in all cases.
For cross-subject transferability, most of the attack methods showed a high level (greater than 70% misclassification rate) of untargeted transferability. With an increase in the value of epsilon, the misclassification rate increased, with only a small difference between the odd and even models. Epsilon (ϵ) bounds the magnitude of the adversarial perturbation that is added to the original samples to get adversarial samples. The Carlini-Wagner method was once again struggling to find transferable perturbations at all values of epsilon. For targeted attack, the maximum success rate on the odd model was around 22%, and only the Basic Iterative method, Saliency Map method, and Carlin-Wagner method were able to achieve this level of performance. Also, the success rate of the Momentum Iterative method and Fast Gradient Sign method plummets to zero at ϵ = 0.9.
In the next experiment, we evaluated the transferability across sensor body positions using the data from sensors placed at chest and right-wrist. We found strong untargeted adversarial transferability between the models for all types of attack methods. Only the Saliency Map method had poor misclassification rate. In contrast, the success rate of targeted transferability was 0% at all values of epsilon for all attack methods. In this case, irrespective of the attack methods, the targeted adversarial examples computed using the chest model were not able to fool the wrist model. But the success of the adversarial examples on the chest model was 100% at higher values of epsilon. This confirmed that even though sensor systems share many aspects and vulnerabilities with traditional machine learning systems, they also have unique qualities that require personalized measures and attention in terms of adversarial attacks and defense.
Finally, in the last experiment, we analyzed transferability across datasets. For this, we used the UCI and MHEALTH datasets, which have common activity classes between them. Using the model trained on the UCI dataset, we computed adversarial examples and evaluated them on both the UCI and MHEALTH model. We found strong untargeted transferability between the datasets, but once again, like in the case for transferability across sensor body positions, the success rate of the targeted adversarial examples on the MHEALTH model was 0% at all values of epsilon. This was true for all attack methods, which were able to achieve the success rate of 100% on the UCI model.
In this work, we have defined novel concepts of adversarial transferability in the context of sensor systems and showed how these affects the performance of an adversary operating in these threat models. In particular we want to highlight these findings:
(1) The traditional notion of transferability -transferability across machine learning models -was found to hold for sensor systems, with good conformance with the literature. (2) Non-parametric algorithms such as decision tree and k-nearest neighbor were more robust to targeted and untargeted adversarial examples computed using both gradient and non-gradient based attack methods. (3) For simple variations in the sensor reading introduced by biases and artifacts stemmed from the user's physical and gait characteristics, the attack methods were able to find perturbations at higher values of epsilon that showed good level (22%) of transferability. (4) We found gradient-based attack methods to be more competent at finding adversarial perturbations that were not only able to fool the target system but also showed in most cases better transferability for both targeted and untargeted attacks. Attacks involving complicated optimization with significantly longer run times performed poorly in terms of transferability but showed higher misclassification and success rate on the target model even at lower values of epsilon. (5) In all cases of transferability, untargeted attacks were more successful than the targeted attack. This is because untargeted attacks are considered successful as long as they are able to achieve random misclassfication, which is much easier to achieve in a sensor system. The nature of the time-series input to sensor systems makes them more vulnerable to random misclassification because the data they operate on have properties that are easier to exploit. However, the complexity of adversarial attacks increases significantly in the targeted case. For the targeted case, the attack methods not only have to find adversarial perturbations, but they also have to make sure that generated adversarial examples conform to the temporal and spatial properties present in the dataset for the chosen target class. Due to this the targeted transferability was very poor in most cases and was at 0% for the cases of transferability across sensor body position and transferability across datasets.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this work, we have tried to cover the topic of adversarial transferability in wearable sensor systems in a broad manner. Nonetheless, our work does have some limitations, which we have highlighted below.
• In our experiments, we have used five different adversarial attack methods to evaluate adversarial transferability in wearable sensor systems. However, there are many more attack methods in the literature that we have left out of our discussion. These unexplored attack methods with better optimization methods may be able to find adversarial perturbation with better transferability properties and succeed where the discussed attack methods have failed. • The discussion of adversarial machine learning can not be complete without talking about defense against attack methods. Attack and defense form the two faces of the adversarial machine learning coin, and hence should be given equal importance and attention in research. Our discussion in this work does not discuss defense mechanisms, and we aim to explore the effects of defense methods against adversarial transferability in our future works. Based on the limitations of our work and results from the experiments, some possible research work that can build on our findings are:
• In this work, we have only discussed the level of performance of different attack methods in terms of transferability. One interesting question that we can ask based on our results is, "What makes some attack methods to have higher/lower rates transferability than others?". We think this is one of the fundamental questions that need to be answered to better understand the results we have showed in this work.
• One straightforward extension to our work can address the limitations we have discussed earlier. This will involve including more types of attack methods for analysis in the framework we have outlined and also introduce defense methods in the picture. • The third possible research direction could be to find mechanisms that can make adversarial examples more transferable. This will enable us to compute adversarial perturbation that has high targeted transferability properties and also help us understand what makes an adversarial example transferable. In this regard, a potential approach is to explore the similarities and differences between transferable and non-transferable adversarial examples using graphical and signal analysis methods.
